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The Selling Real Estate Broker and the 
Purchaser: Assessing the Relationship 
Residential real property sellers have traditionally em- 
ployed licensed real estate brokers1 to find suitable purchasers 
for their properties. In a typical real estate transaction, the 
broker and the seller enter into an agency relationship through 
written agreement, thus creating a fiduciary relationship be- 
tween the seller, as principal, and the broker, as agent. On the 
basis of this fiduciary relationship, the broker is required to act 
with utmost good faith toward the seller in protecting the 
seller's best  interest^.^ While the broker's duty to the seller is 
clearly recognized, an increasing number of courts have also 
recognized a legal duty owed by the broker to the pur~haser.~ 
The uncertainty of the exact nature of the relationship 
between the selling broker and the purchaser has been confus- 
ing to those in the real estate industry as well as to the general 
public. Understandably, the broker is uncertain as to his duties 
because of the legal predicament in which he finds himself. The 
broker is obviously aware that as the seller's agent he owes a 
fiduciary duty to the seller. In addition, the broker is becoming 
1. "Broker," as used in this Comment, refers to a real estate broker, sales- 
person or licensee. 
2. See, eg., M.S.R., Tnc. v. Lish, 527 P.2d 912, 914 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) ("Un- 
der both the common law and applicable statutes, a real estate agent, in all deal- 
ings affecting the subject matter of his agency, has a fiduciary duty to act with 
the utmost faith and loyalty in behalf of his principal."). For a more detailed dis- 
cussion of this good faith requirement, see infia notes 13-22 and accompanying 
text. 
3. See, e.g., Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1975) (broker who outbid 
buyer for property breached fiduciary duty to deal fairly with buyer); Bevins v. 
Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 761-63 (Alaska 1982) (buyer has cause of action against bro- 
ker for i ~ o c e n t  misrepresentation communicated by broker); Easton v. 
Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (Ct. App. 1984) (broker has affirmative duty 
to investigate property and disclose material defects to buyer); Zichlin v. Dill, 25 
So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1946) (broker owes duty to buyer to deal fairly and ethically); 
Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1369-70 (Ohio 1979) (broker owes duty to 
buyer to correct prior, misleading representations concerning condition of property); 
Wegg v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 557 P.2d 861, 863-64 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (hold- 
ing broker liable to buyer for failure to advise buyer of seller's remedies under 
land sale contract in event of buyer's default). 
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aware of a duty he owes to the purchaser-a duty which re- 
mains unclear but appears to be expanding. Both the broker 
and the prospective purchaser need direction in understanding 
the precise nature of the broker's duties. 
This comment analyzes this brokerlpurchaser relationship. 
Part I1 reviews existing agency law applicable to a selling bro- 
ker and explains how this law is reflected in a broker's rela- 
tionship with a purchaser. Part I1 also discusses possible prob- 
lem areas arising out of the establishment of an agency rela- 
tionship between the selling broker and the purchaser, includ- 
ing the need to rely on the court to find an agency relationship, 
dual agency, and subagency in Multiple Listing Service trans- 
actions. Part 111 reviews the duties owed by the selling broker 
t o  the purchaser absent the establishment of an agency rela- 
tionship. In conclusion, Part IV proposes not only that the 
broker be required to disclose to prospective purchasers that he 
is in a fiduciary relationship with the seller, but also that the 
broker be required to conduct a diligent inspection of the prop- 
erty and disclose any material defects to the purchaser. 
A. Elements of an Agency Relationship 
An agency relationship generally arises when (1) one party 
manifests its intention that another shall act on its behalf; (2) 
the other party consents to such relationship; and (3) the party 
for whom the other acts has the right to control the ultimate 
direction of the cooperative e f f~r t .~  
The first element is the principal's manifestation of his 
intent that the agent act for him.5 In the typical agency rela- 
tionship, one authorizes another to act on his behalf either by 
written or spoken words or by conduct through which another 
may reasonably believe that such authorization to act was 
given. 
The second element requires that the agent accept respon- 
sibility to act for the principal.' No specific words are neces- 
4. S e e  RESTATEMENT. (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). 
5 .  See id. $ 15.  
6. See. id. $ 26. Because the primary aspect is the principal's manifestation 
that the agent shall act in his behalf, what the principal actually intends is not 
important in deciding whether there is an agency relationship. Id. $ 26 cmt. a. 
Silence may also be a manifestation of authorization. Id. $ 26 crnt. d. 
7. See id. 8 15 cmt. c. 
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sary to find such an acceptance. If the principal communicates 
to  the purported agent his desire that the agent act on his 
behalf, and the agent subsequently acts as requested without 
expressly accepting the responsibility, the principal may rea- 
sonably infer from these actions that the agent acted on the 
principal's behalf? 
The final element requires that the principal has the right 
to control the direction of the cooperative effort.' Though the 
principal may exercise the right to control either before the 
agent acts, at the time the agent acts, or at both times, the 
principal need not exercise this right at all.1° To establish an 
agency relationship, the principal needs only to exhibit the 
right to control the ultimate direction of the cooperative effort, 
not a specific act. As a result, the principal may have no control 
over the actual physical acts of an agent." As long as the 
agency agreement does not specify exactly how the agent is to 
perform, the principal may not interfere with the agent's ac- 
tions which are customarily within the agent's control.12 
B. The Agent's Powers and Duties 
Once the principallagent relationship has been established, 
the agent is authorized both to bind the principal to third par- 
ties and to alter the principal's relationships with these par- 
t ied3 However, these agency powers also give rise to agency 
duties. Because the agent is in a fiduciary relationship with the 
principal concerning those matters which fall within the 
agency's scope,14 the agent must act primarily for the 
principal's benefit as t o  such matters. These duties include 
making reasonable, diligent efforts to accomplish the agency 
8. See id. $ 15 cmt. b, illus. 3. 
9. See id. $ 14. 
10. See id. $ 14 cmt. a. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. See id 5 12 cmt. a. In a real estate transaction, however, even the listing 
broker does not usually have the power to bind the seller by signing the contract 
of sale on behalf of the seller. See, e g . ,  Holland v. H a ~ a n ,  456 A.2d 807, 817 
(D.C. 1983) (well-settled principle that broker cannot bind seller to contract of 
sale); Carroll v. Action Enter., Inc., 292 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Neb. 1980) (broker has no 
authority to enter into binding contract of sale on behalf of owner). 
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 13 (1958); see also SNML Corp. v. 
Bank of N.C., 254 S.E.2d 274, 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) ("An agent is a fiduciary 
concerning the matters within the scope of his agency."). 
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objectives;15 acting in accordance with the principal's reason- 
able instr~ctions;'~ exercising the standard of care and skill 
common to the locality for those matters within the agent's 
scope and using any special skill that the agent may pos- 
sess;" dsclosing to the principal all material facts relating to 
agency matters that are within the agent's knowledge or which 
the agent may disco~er;'~ accounting for funds received or 
spent in performing the agency's activities;" abstaining from 
acting for one whose interests are adverse to the  principal'^;'^ 
avoiding competition with the principal for the agent's benefit 
or for a third party's benefit with respect to agency matters;"' 
and refraining from disclosing confidential information received 
from the principal regarding agency matters.22 
C. Application to the Selling Broker's 
Relationship with the Purchaser 
Determining whether an agency relationship exists be- 
tween a selling broker and a purchaser requires an application 
of the traditional agency elements. 
1.  Principal manifests intention that agent act on his behalf 
First, an inquiry must be made as to whether the purchas- 
er manifests an intent that the selling broker act on his behalf. 
pp -- - 
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 377 cmt. b (1958). 
16. See id. $ 385 cmt. a. Business custom determines what is reasonable. Id. 
17. See id. !j 379(1); see also I. Cohen Sons, Inc. v. Dowd, 84 P.2d 830, 831 
(Colo. 1938) (agent who holds himself out as possessing special skills is liable for 
losses from failure to possess and exercise those skills); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Min- 
nesota Transfer Ry., 16 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Minn. 1944) (agent owes to principal the 
use of such skill required to accomplish the object of employment). 
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 381 (1958); see also MacGregor v. 
Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 709, 712 (Fla. 1958) (duty to inform princi- 
pal of all pertinent fads); Santaniello v. Department of Professional Regulation, 
432 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (duty to inform principal of all fads 
within agent's knowledge). 
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 382 (1958). 
20. See id. $5 23, 24. An agent may act for a principal when his interests are 
adverse provided that the agent discloses the adverse aspect of the relationship to 
the principal. Id. 
21. See id. $ 387; see also Ehringer v. Brookfield & Assocs., 415 So. 2d 774, 
776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (agent who furthers his own interests over those of 
the principal breaches his fiduciary duty); Mitchell v. Allison, 213 P.2d 231, 233-34 
(N.M. 1949) (broker who purchases property for himself rather than his principal 
breaches his fiduciary duty). 
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY $ 395 (1958). Some matters require 
confidentiality even after the agency relationship has terminated. See d. 5 396. 
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Typically, since no formal agency agreement exists between the 
selling broker and the purchaser, one must examine the activi- 
ties of the selling broker and the purchaser to determine 
whether the required intent is actually present. 
In a modern real estate transaction, numerous acts by the 
purchaser reasonably imply that the purchaser intended the 
selling broker to act on his behalf. In a typical transaction, the 
purchaser approaches the broker and either inquires about 
specific property or discusses generally with the broker the 
purchaser's desires and needs. The purchaser seeks the selling 
broker's assistance to acquire pertinent information regarding 
the specific property or to  locate other property in which the 
purchaser may be interested. The purchaser relies on the sell- 
ing broker's expertise not only to ascertain the fair market 
value of the property, but also to  determine whether to include 
in the offer financing terms, inspection and repair procedures, 
and other contingencies. As a result of these communications, 
the purchaser reveals to the selling broker some of the most 
personal aspects of his financial condition and needs. 
The purchaser subsequently authorizes the selling broker 
to deliver the offer to the seller on the purchaser's behalf. Once 
the seller accepts the offer, the purchaser often seeks and relies 
on the selling broker's experience regarding title examination, 
financing, inspections, and so forth. Thus, in the typical real 
estate transaction, the purchaser's actions reasonably permit 
one to infer that the selling broker is the purchaser's agent, 
acting on the purchaser's behalf.23 
2. Agent consents to an agency relationship 
The next question is whether the selling broker's actions 
reasonably indicate to the purchaser that the broker is consent- 
ing to act on the purchaser's behalf. Whether such consent 
exists must be determined from existing  circumstance^?^ 
23. See Molly M. Romero, Note, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Ariz- 
ona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767, 772-73 (1978). 
24. See, e.g., Butler v. Colorado Int'l Pancakes, Inc., 510 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1973) (franchisee held to be the franchisor's agent when the franchisor 
specifically instructed the franchisee to "buy back" the plaintiff's subfranchise and 
also instructed the franchisee to harass the plaintiff into selling); Duffy v. Setchell, 
347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (broker may be held to be the buyer's 
agent if the buyer requests the broker's assistance in obtaining a particular piece 
of property, even though the broker is paid nothing by the buyer and it is expect- 
ed that he will receive a fee from the seller). 
1140 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
The selling broker usually suggests by his conduct that he 
has consented to  act on the purchaser's behalf. In the typical 
transaction, the selling broker endeavors to determine the 
purchaser's wants and needs and attempts to match them with 
available property. In attempting to locate a property, the sell- 
ing broker often uses a Multiple Listing Service (MLS).25 Once 
a property is located in the MLS, the broker provides the pur- 
chaser with all the available, pertinent information outlined in 
the MLS. Next, the selling broker often advises the purchaser 
regardmg the terms to include in his offer relating to condi- 
- tions of title, financing, inspections and repairs, and so forth. 
At the purchaser's request, the selling broker then presents the 
offer t o  the listing brokerz6 and the seller, individuals with 
whom the selling broker may be unacquainted. The selling 
broker then negotiates with the listing broker and the seller to 
establish terms under which the seller and purchaser may 
reach agreement. Once the parties enter into the purchase and 
sale agreement, the selling broker advises the purchaser of 
available financing, prevailing interest rates, reputable inspec- 
tion companies, and other relevant information. In general, the 
selling broker's conduct leads the purchaser to believe that the 
broker is acting as the purchaser's repre~entative.~' 
3. Principal controls the direction of the cooperative effort 
The final question in determining the existence of an agen- 
cy relationship is whether the purchaser, as principal, has the 
25. A multiple listing service is typically defined as an arrangement between 
independent real estate brokers in a particular locale whereby each member broker 
is authorized to sell property exclusively listed by any other member broker. 
By agreement between the member brokers, all pertinent listings with the 
various members are registered with a central exchange office or bureau 
and thereafter disseminated to the other member brokers for their infor- 
mation and action. When a sale of a listed propertyy [sic] is introduced 
by any member broker, other than the listing broker, the sales commis- 
sion is divided between the selling broker, the listing broker, and the cen- 
tral registration office. 
Frisell v. Newman, 429 P.2d 864, 868 (Wash. 1967). 
26. A listing broker's "role is merely to procure an executed listing agreement 
and submit it to the MIS for distribution." D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF REAL 
ESTATE BROKERS 5 1.15, at  1:16 (2d ed. 1992). Thus, the listing broker has con- 
traded with the seller as an agent. In contrast, a selling broker in this context is 
"the broker who obtains the offer to purchase from the buyer." Romero, supra note 
23, 771 n.23. 
27. See generally BURKE, supra note 26, 5 1.5 (discussing the legal mechanics of 
the MLS). 
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right to  control the ultimate direction of the cooperative effort. 
Because the control need only relate to the general course or 
direction of the agency, the purchaser need not supervise or 
direct the specific steps in the process. Moreover, the purchaser 
is not expected t o  direct the broker's actions in detail because a 
broker typically has greater knowledge than the purchaser over 
the specific aspects of the real estate transaction. 
In a modem-day real estate transaction, several factors 
indicate that the purchaser controls the general direction of the 
agency relationship. First, the purchaser is the party that de- 
cides which property to  investigate. Second, having examined 
the property, the purchaser then decides whether to make an 
offer, and if so, the offer's terms. After an offer is made, the 
purchaser has the right to withdraw the offer before the seller 
accepts it subject to certain  limitation^.^' Finally, the purchas- 
er may accept or reject any counteroffer. Therefore, the pur- 
chaser exerts his right t o  control the general direction of the 
relationship by exercising his power t o  approve or disapprove 
any agreements made during the negotiation process. Through- 
out the typical brokerlpurchaser relationship, the purchaser 
sufficiently controls the direction of the relationship with the 
selling broker to establish an agency relationship. 
D. Problems Arising from an Agency Relationship 
Between the Selling Broker and the Purchaser 
Even though the relationship between the selling broker 
and the purchaser in a modern day real estate transaction 
evidences an agency relationship, several problems arise from 
this characterization. First, the purchaser must rely on a court 
to find an implied agency relationship; second, the problem of 
dual agency arises when the broker acts as agent for both the 
buyer and seller; and third, the problem of subagency often 
arises in Multiple Listing Service transactions. These three 
problems call into question the wisdom of implying an agency 
relationship between the purchaser and the selling broker. 
1. Purchaser must rely on a court to find implied agency 
relationship 
Because the selling broker does not usually enter into an 
express, contractual agency relationship with the purchaser, 
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTKACTS 9 42 (1981). 
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the purchaser must rely on a court to make the determination 
that an implied agency relationship actually existed between 
the parties. This may be a difficult task for a court, especially 
in light of several factors which indicate that the selling broker 
is already in an agency relationship with the seller. 
First, in situations in which the broker is involved in both 
listing and selling the property, the seller and the broker enter 
into a contractual agency relationship prior to the purchaser's 
involvement. Nevertheless, the mere existence of a written 
listing agreement between the seller and the broker does not 
automatically negate the possibility that the broker may also 
represent the p~rchaser.~' The second factor, and perhaps the 
strongest in&cator of an agency relationship between the bro- 
ker and the seller, is that the seller pays the broker's commis- 
sion. One commentator has stated: 
The seller's responsibility for payment of the commission, and 
the buyer's apparent noninvolvement, is strong evidence tend- 
ing to show that the broker or brokers involved in the trans- 
action are employed by the seller. Absent a strong showing 
otherwise, this evidence supports the theory that the broker 
owes fiduciary duties solely to the seller.30 
Although the commission payment by the seller strongly evi- 
dences that the broker is the seller's agent, this factor is like- 
wise inconclusive. Some courts have found the broker to  repre- 
sent the purchaser even though the broker was in fact paid by 
the seller.31 
29. See PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn. 1978) (jury 
question as to whether broker was acting for both the buyer and the seller); 
Billington v. Crowder, 553 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (broker can act 
for seller, buyer, or both); Mayes v. Emery, 475 P.2d 124, 128 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1970) (agency relationship between seller's broker and buyer arose when the broker 
undertook to have an inspection of the property conducted for the buyer); see also 
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 31 (1980) ("The question as to whom a broker represents in a 
transaction is determinable from the facts."). 
30. William J .  Minick, 111 & Marlynn A. Parada, The Real Estate Broker's Fi- 
duciary Duties: An Examination of Current Industry Standardq and Practices, 12 
PEPP. L. REV. 145, 154 (1984). 
31. See Ramey v. Myers, 245 P.2d 360, 364 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (agency 
relationship between the broker and the buyer inferred from the broker and 
buyer's friendship and from the broker's advice to the buyer); Banner v. Elm, 248 
A.2d 452, 455 (Md. 1968) ("It is not uncommon for a condition of sale to be that 
the agent of the purchaser shall be paid by the seller."); Billington v. Crowder, 553 
S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) ("Even though the identity of the party who 
is to pay the broker may not be conclusive of the identity of his principal, it is 
nevertheless a strong circumstance."). 
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2. The problem of dual agency 
One problem that arises when courts find that the broker 
acted as agent for the purchaser as well as the seller is that of 
dual agency. In this situation, the broker takes it upon himself 
to represent the best interests of both the seller and the pur- 
chaser. Thus, the broker owes both parties the same fiduciary 
duty3%d degree of care as he would if he represented each 
party separately. The broker must act loyally, fairly, and in 
good faith, with respect to both the seller and the purchaser.33 
Despite the conflicts inherent in the dual agency relation- 
ship, courts have generally recognized the legitimacy of this 
relationship provided that the broker make full disclosure to 
both parties before the agency relationship is establi~hed.~~ 
However, making such disclosure and obtaining the consent of 
both parties might be difficult given the usual residential 
transaction. Typically, no agreement is executed between the 
broker and the purchaser before the broker undertakes the 
task of locating suitable residential property for the purchaser. 
Likewise, obtaining the seller's consent to  a dual agency rela- 
tionship is problematic because a seller who fully understands 
the implications of consenting to  a brokerlpurchaser relation- 
ship may be reluctant to  disclose to  the broker his true expecta- 
tions regarding the sale of his property. Consequently, because 
the broker may be unable to satisfy the seller's needs, the sell- 
er might resist the dual agency arrangement. 
32. For a discussion of the fiduciary duties owed by a broker to his principal, 
see supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text. 
33. See, eg., Martin v. Hieken, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) ("A 
broker so unwise as to place himself in the anomalous position of representing 
adverse parties must scrupulously observe and fulfill his duties to both."); Invest- 
ment Exch. Realty, Inc. v. Hillcrest Bowl, Inc., 513 P.2d 282, 284 (Wash. 1973) (en 
banc) ("[A] real estate broker owes to his client the duty to exercise the utmost 
good faith . . . . Loyalty is the chief virtue required of an agent." (citations omit- 
ted)). 
34. See, e.g., PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 1978); 
Cogan v. Kidder, Mathews & Segner, Inc., 648 P.2d 875, 877 (Wash. 1982) (en 
banc). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 392 (1958), which provides: 
An agent who, to the knowledge of two principals, a d s  for both of them 
in a transaction between them, has a duty to act with fairness to each 
and to disclose to each all facts which he knows or should know would 
reasonably affect the judgment of each in permitting such dual agency, 
except as to a principal who has manifested that he knows such facts or 
does not care to know them. 
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The shortcomings of dual agency are further illustrated by 
the requirement that the broker disclose any material facts 
that would reasonably affect the principal's decision to buy or 
sell the property.35 As a dual agent, the broker must consider 
whether he is required to  reveal the purchaser's highest price 
t o  the seller and the seller's lowest price to  the purchaser. 
Though the broker is generally permitted to act as a dual 
agent, when confidential information such as a statement about 
price is given to  the agent by the principal, the agency's duty 
compels the broker's silence.36 
Although legal decisions may allow dual agency, the broker 
is put in the precarious situation of having to provide full dis- 
closure to one party without harming the interests of the other. 
Because of the opposing goals of the seller and the purchas- 
er,37 the broker will almost assuredly breach either his fidu- 
ciary duty owed t o  the individual party or his duty t o  disclose. 
3. The problem of subagency in Multiple Listing Service 
transactions 
If the agency elements are present in the typical real es- 
tate transaction involving a selling broker and a purchaser, a 
problem also arises when the listing broker agrees to "cooper- 
ate" with the selling broker by sharing the commission in re- 
turn for the selling broker finding a purchaser who is ready, 
willing, and able to purchase the property. Such "cooperation" 
refers to the real estate industry's established practice of using 
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 8 381 (1958); see also Koller v. 
Belote, 528 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (broker did not disclose to the 
prospective purchasers the impossibility of securing the best price and terms avail- 
able while representing the best interests of the seller). 
36. The agent . . . is under no duty to disclose, and has a duty not to dis- 
close to one principal, confidential information given to him by the other, 
such as the price he is willing to pay. If the information is of such a 
nature that he cannot fairly give advice to one without disclosing it, he 
cannot properly continue to act as advisor. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 8 392 cmt. b (1958) (emphasis added). 
37. See Nahn-Heberer Realty Co. v. Schrader, 89 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1936). 
The interests of the buyer and the seller are naturally antagonistic to 
each other. The broker, in undertaking to arrange terms between them, if 
he favors the buyer is necessarily disregarding the interest of the seller, 
and, if he favors the seller, is necessarily disregarding the interest of the 
buyer. 
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an MLS, whereby listing brokers agree to pool all listings and 
to cooperate with other MLS member-brokers who produce 
purchasers for the listed proper tie^.^^ This arrangement clear- 
ly benefits both sellers and purchasers by exposing sellers' 
properties to  more potential purchasers and by affording pur- 
chasers a larger selection of available properties. In addition, 
the MLS has eased the geographical barrier between purchaser 
and seller and enhanced the flow of information and communi- 
cation between the parties.39 
In an MLS arrangement, an agency relationship is obvious- 
ly recognized between the listing broker and the seller based on 
the contractual privity between them. The contract typically 
authorizes the listing broker to use the services of other bro- 
kers. Therefore, any broker other than the listing broker who 
attempts to arrange a sale of the property is considered a sub- 
agent of the listing broker. However, since the selling broker 
has never been in direct contact with the seller, neither the 
seller nor the selling broker is often aware of the fiduciary 
relationship that exists between them. Sellers may be surprised 
to discover that this relationship actually increases the seller's 
liabilities to third parties for misleading statements or omis- 
sions relating to the property. Based on agency doctrine, the 
seller, as principal, is liable for the misrepresentations made by 
his agents and his subagents.*' 
Though courts have generally upheld the agency relation- 
ship based on a subagency theory?l the effects of this theory 
are actually adverse to the purchaser's best interests. Under 
this theory, courts have held that both the listing and selling 
brokers are in a fiduciary relationship with the seller.42 As 
38. See generally Arthur D. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing 
Systems as  Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1328-30 (1970) (discuss- 
ing the advantages of multiple listing systems). 
39. See id. at 1329. 
40. RES~ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 256-264 (1958). 
41. See, e.g., F e ~ e l l  v. Ross, 711 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Ark. 1986); Stortroen v. 
Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391, 396 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Givan v. 
Aldemeyer/Stegman/Kaiser, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990). 
42. See, eg., Licari v. Blackwelder, 539 A.2d 609, 613 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) 
("A real estate broker acting as a subagent with the express permission of another 
broker who has the listing of the property to be sold is  under the same duty as 
the primary broker to act in the utmost good faith."); Mersky v. Multiple Listing 
Bureau of Olympia, Inc., 437 P.2d 897 (Wash. 1968). In Mersky, the court stated: 
[Tlhere flows from this agency relationship and its accompanying obliga- 
tions of utmost fidelity and good faith, the legal, ethical, and moral re- 
sponsibility on the part of the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to 
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such, this arrangement leaves the purchaser without adequate 
representation. Thus, even though the majority of purchasers 
undoubtedly believe that the selling broker is representing the 
purchaser's best interests, application of the subagency doctrine 
makes this belief a delusion. 
Though some courts have taken alternative, and arguably 
better the rule that the selling broker is a sub- 
agent of the listing broker, and thus an agent of the seller, 
remains the dominant view.44 Therefore, the purchaser must 
understand at the outset of the transaction that he is not rep- 
resented. One way to  provide this information is to impose a 
disclosure requirement upon the broker. One commentator 
described this suggested communication requirement: 
exercise reasonable care, skill, and judgment in securing for the principal 
the best bargain possible; to scrupulously avoid representing any interest 
antagonistic to that of the principal in transactions involving the 
principal's listed property, or otherwise self-dealing with that property, 
without the explicit and fully informed consent of the principal; and to 
make, in all instances, a full, fair, and timely disclosure to the principal 
of all facts within the knowledge or coming to the attention of the broker 
or his subagents which are, or may be, material in connection with the 
matter for which the broker is employed, and which might affect the 
principal's rights and interests or influence his actions. 
437 P.2d a t  899 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
43. See, e.g., Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Blocklinger 
v. Schlegel, 374 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 
(Iowa 1985). 
In Wise, the court concluded that no agency relationship existed between the 
selling and listing brokers, stating that "a multi-list arrangement between listing 
and selling agents is not an agency relationship unless clearly proven otherwise." 
353 A.2d a t  209. The court reasoned that the local MLS defined itself as an "infor- 
mation exchange"; that the MLS had no provision for control of the selling broker 
by the listing broker, as is required in an agency relationship; and that the split- 
ting of the fee commission was no "indicia of agency," because independent con- 
tractors split fees as well. Id. 
In BlockZinger, the sellers argued that the purchaser, who was a real estate 
broker, became their subagent by virtue of an MLS agreement. 374 N.E.2d at 493. 
The court, however, found that no fiduciary duty existed between the parties be- 
cause there was no actual agency relationship because of the MLS agreement. Id. 
Referring to the tenuous relationship created by the MLS concept between a seller 
and a broker, the court stated that "the business of being a realtor is not one 
containing an  element of public interest so as to require him to deal as a fiduciary 
with everyone." Id. 
In Menzel, the court adhered to the rule that a "real estate broker is the agent 
of the party who first employs him or her, and this may be the buyer even though 
i t  is anticipated the fee will be received from the seller." 362 N.W.2d a t  475. The 
court noted that the MLS arrangement meant only that the selling broker would 
receive some commission from the listing broker. Id. 
44. BZJRKE, supra note 26, $ 1.6, at  1:35. 
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Brokers could be required by law or regulation to inform 
buyers of the agency relationship the broker has directly with 
some sellers, through listing agreements, and indirectly with 
others, through multiple listing arrangements. The broker 
would have to explain that he may not volunteer more infor- 
mation than the owner of the home would have to disclose nor 
give advice about the appropriate price or s;ubjective qualities 
of the houses in~pected.~' 
Requiring the selling broker to advise the potential pur- 
chaser that he will be acting solely as the seller's agent would 
help clarify the nature of the broker's relationship with the 
seller and the purchaser and would assist in overcoming the 
misleading and confusing nature of the current system. Other 
effects of this disclosure requirement have been outlined as 
follows: 
The buyer . . . would be less likely to rely unquestioningly on 
the broker. Since the buyer would be less likely to rely on the 
selling broker, the broker's potential liability for fraud o r  
misrepresentation should be lessened-the buyer would be 
aware that he must search out new avenues of information 
concerning the property. A disclosure form would also benefit 
the broker by serving a s  a constant reminder that he is the 
agent of the seller and must not give the buyer any mislead- 
ing signals.46 
Though such a mandatory disclosure requirement would 
likely clarify the brokerlpurchaser relationship, brokers may be 
hesitant to  disclose such information to  potential purchasers.47 
Advising the purchaser at the outset of the transaction that 
neither the listing nor the selling broker represents him may 
encourage the purchaser to seek alternative representation. 
Though it would likely be more advantageous to the purchaser 
to employ her own broker or attorney as her representative, 
such a concept works adversely to the selling broker's psycho- 
logical advantage of getting the purchaser committed in writing 
as soon as possible. Nevertheless, a mandatory disclosure re- 
45. Barry A. Currier, Finding the Broker's Place in the Typical Residential Real 
Estate Transaction, 33 U .  FLA. L. REV. 655, 679 (1981). 
46. Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the 
Duty to Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 951-52 (1987). 
47. Joseph M. Grohman, A Reassessment of the SeJling Real Estate Broker's 
Agency Relationship with the Purchaser, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 560, 584 (1987). 
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quirement with the potential for broker liability for noncksclo- 
sure would cause the wary broker to think twice before violat- 
ing this ethical and legal responsibility. 
Another potential problem with imposing this disclosure 
duty upon the broker is that merely revealing the existence of 
the subagency relationship between the listing and the selling 
broker still fails to provide the purchaser with adequate repre- 
sentation of the purchaser's  interest^.^' However, this concern 
is somewhat alleviated by imposing a duty upon the broker to 
exercise reasonable care to discover and disclose material de- 
fects in the property.49 
111. THE SELLING BROKER'S DUTIES TO THE 
PURCHASER ABSENT AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP 
Even if no agency relationship exists between the selling 
broker and the purchaser, the question remains whether the 
broker still owes a fiduciary duty to  the purchaser. A fiduciary 
relationship is generally created when one party, the purchas- 
er, places trust and confidence in another party, the broker, 
because of the broker's superior skill and experti~e.~' "More 
specifically, a fiduciary relationship is created where one party 
has expressly reposed trust and confidence in the other; where 
trust and confidence, although not express, are implied because 
of a past history of fiduciary dealings; or where the very nature 
of the transaction is fiduciary."51 
Originally, the lack of an agency relationship led most 
courts to fmd that the broker owed no fiduciary duty to the 
purchaser. The rationale for this conclusion was that the bro- 
ker, as agent for the seller, stood in the seller's shoes and had 
the same relationship to the purchaser as did the seller.5z 
However, a number of courts have found that the broker does 
owe a legal fiduciary duty to the purchaser even though the 
broker and purchaser are not in any agency relationship. 
48. Id. at 585. 
49. For a more detailed discussion of this duty, see infia part IV. 
50. See Fairfield Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kroll, 246 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1969) (holding broker to be in fiduciary relationship with elderly purchaser 
because broker undertook to obtain financing for purchaser). 
51. Kathryn J. Brown, Expansion of a Real Estate Brokr's Duties: Is Easton v. 
Strassburger in Illinois' Future? 5 N .  ILL. U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1984) (citing JOJXN 
N. POMEROY, EQUITY JIJRISPRUDENCE $ 902 (5th ed. 1941)). 
52. See Paul A. Longton, Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Es taf~  Broker- 
Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1972). 
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In Harper v. Adamet~?~ the Connecticut Supreme Court 
held that the real estate broker breached his fiduciary duty to 
the purchaser when he misrepresented the seller's minimum 
price and failed to disclose the purchaser's offer to  the seller.54 
Although the broker was not the purchaser's agent, the court 
concluded that the purchaser had a right to  assume that the 
broker would both "deal honestly with him and be faithful to 
his principal [the ~eller].'"~ Because the broker had breached 
the fiduciary duties he owed to the buyer, the court then im- 
posed a constructive trust on the broker in favor of the pur- 
chaser.56 The court reasoned that a constructive trust 
is most often applied in situations where the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant is one which equity 
clearly recognizes as  fiduciary. But equity has carefixlly re- 
frained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail 
and in such a manner as  to exclude new situations. I t  has left 
the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable 
trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority and 
influence on the other?' 
Thus, despite the absence of a principal-agent relationship, the 
court clearly recognized that the broker owed a legal duty t o  
the purchaser. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Funk v. Tiffts8 
that a real estate broker breached his fiduciary duty of dealing 
fairly and honestly with a prospective p~rchaser.~' In this 
case, the broker failed to  disclose to a prospective purchaser 
that he had submitted a subsequent offer for the realty which 
superseded the prospective purchaser's offer?' As the court 
stated, 
When a real estate broker acts as an intermediary between a 
seller and a prospective purchaser, he is under a duty to deal 
fairly and honestly with the prospective [purchaser]. That 
53. 113 A.2d 136 (Corn. 1955). 
54. Id. at 138-39. After purchasing the property through his son, the broker 
then sold a small portion of the property at a profit to the buyer, leading the 
buyer to believe that the original owner was the seller and had decided to retain 
the balance of the property. Id. at 137-38. 
55. Id. at 139. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. 515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975). 
59. Id. at 25. 
60. Id. at 24. 
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duty is breached when the real estate agent outbids the pro- 
spective [purchaser] without notice to him before the seller 
has acted on his offer.61 
In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Funk denied the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the 
prospective pur~haser .~~  The dissent argued that only those 
acts traditionally held to be a breach of an agent's fiduciary 
duty such as affirmative misrepresentations, misuse of confi- 
dential information, and failure to disclose a conflicting agency 
relationship should be the basis of liability." The dissent con- 
cluded that 
[wlhere the broker is not the agent of the prospective buyer, 
where he acts with the knowledge of his principal, the seller, 
where there is no misuse of confidential information, where 
there is no fraudulent misrepresentation, and where the bro- 
ker bids more than any of the prospective buyers, there 
should be no liability on the part of the broker if the seller 
chooses to accept his offer without asking for another round of 
bids.64 
Many courts have continued to  embrace the traditional 
view and are unwilling to fmd a fiduciary relationship between 
the selling broker and the purchaser.65 In fact, even in cases 
with fads quite similar to  Harper and Funk, courts have ex- 
pressly found that no fiduciary duty existed between the broker 
and purchaser. 
For example, in Klotz v. FauberYG6 the Virginia Supreme 
Court refused to hold the broker liable, even though the broker 
failed to transmit the purchaser's offer to the seller and pur- 
chased the land for himself.67 Likewise, in DiBurro v. 
61. Id. at 25. 
62. Id. at 27 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
63. Id. at 28. 
64. Id. 
65. See Blocklinger v. Schlegel, 374 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) ("Be- 
fore a fiduciary duty arises it must be proven that a realtor has been employed by 
someone and that he is therefore an agent for them."). But see Fairfield Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Kroll, 246 N.E.2d 327, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (agency relationship 
still arose even though broker was not employed by buyer). 
66. 189 S.E.2d 45 (Va. 1972). 
67. Id. The court stated that when a broker fails to communicate the 
purchaser's offer to the seller and subsequently acquires the property herself, the 
broker is liable to the purchaser only if the broker purchases the property at a 
price equal to or less than the price the prospective purchaser agreed to pay. Id. 
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B o n a ~ i a , ~ ~  the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re- 
fused to  hold the broker liable for breach of a fiduciary duty to 
the purchaser. In this case, the prospective purchaser asked 
the broker to determine if a particular piece of property was 
worth the asking price.69 When the broker learned that the 
purchaser was interested in both the seller's property and an 
adjoining tract, the broker eventually purchased both tracts 
without informing the potential p~rchaser.~' However, be- 
cause the broker was not in an agency relationship with the 
purchaser, the court refused to impose a constructive trust on 
the br~ker.~ '  
Recognition of a fiduciary duty between the broker and 
purchaser, in the absence of an actual principahgent relation- 
ship, still gives rise to similar duties owed in an agency rela- 
tionship. Where a relationship is construed as fiduciary, the 
broker owes the purchaser the duties of honesty, loyalty, and 
full disclosure of material information concerning the proper- 
ty.72 If the broker were t o  breach any of these duties, the pur- 
chaser would have a cause of action against the broker. In 
other words, the broker is in virtually the same position as he 
would be in a dual agency situation.73 The broker would have 
to totally disregard his agency relationship with the seller and 
act as agent for both parties. Placing a broker in such a po- 
sition will almost certainly cause the broker to breach his fidu- 
ciary duty to one of the parties. Surely the courts that have 
imposed these fiduciary duties on the broker did not intend to 
place the broker in such a precarious situation. 
Perhaps the courts' willingness to impose a fiduciary duty 
on the broker arises primarily from the traditional notion that 
the seller's relationship with the purchaser was one of caveat 
ernpt~r.?~ Thus, the broker, acting as the seller's agent, was 
also bound by the doctrine of caveat emptor. To circumvent the 
Because the prospective purchaser had not alleged that his offer equalled or ex- 
ceeded the price the broker paid, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. 
Id. 
68. 71 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 1947). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 402. 
72. For a discussion of these fiduciary duties, see supra notes 13-22 and ac- 
companying text. 
73. For a discussion of the dual agency problem, see supra notes 32-37 and ac- 
companying text. 
74. Longton, supra note 52, at 1345. 
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harsh doctrine of caveat emptor, courts found that the broker 
had not only a duty to deal fairly with the purchaser, but also 
a heightened duty to deal with utmost trust and confidence-as 
a "fiduciary." Though the courts understandably wanted to 
protect the purchaser, such a heightened duty may have had 
the unintended result of putting the broker in an untenable 
legal position.75 What courts today may really mean by the 
use of the term "fiduciary duty" is that the broker has the duty 
to treat the purchaser honestly and fairly.76 Perhaps a better 
way t o  view the relationship of the broker and the purchaser is 
not as a fiduciary one, but as a normal business relationship in 
which the broker must not intentionally or negligently mislead 
the purchaser. 
IV. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION AND CONCLUSION 
The real estate broker unquestionably owes some sort of 
legal duty t o  the purchaser in a residential real estate transac- 
tion. However, courts at best have been inconsistent in defining 
and interpreting the precise nature of this duty. As a result, 
the real estate industry and the general public are both under- 
standably confused about the proper relationship between the 
broker and the purchaser. 
In a typical real estate transaction, the broker is already in 
a fiduciary relationship with the seller. Accordingly, an addi- 
tional fiduciary duty toward the purchaser should not be im- 
posed on the selling broker. The legal imposition of a fiduciary 
relationship with the purchaser would put the broker in the 
impossible situation of having to act in the best interest of both 
parties. Attempts by the broker to act in the best interest of 
both the seller and the purchaser may very well result in a law 
suit against the broker by one or both parties. 
Nevertheless, the broker cannot simply protect the seller's 
best interests and ignore those of the purchaser. In the modern 
residential real estate transaction involving an MLS agree- 
ment, the selling broker will spend many hours with the pur- 
chaser. As a result, the purchaser will come to depend and rely 
75. "On one hand, the broker has an established agency relationship with the 
seller. On the other hand, the uncertainty of the law leaves a broker in the inse- 
cure position of fulfilling vague fiduciary duties toward the buyer in order to avoid 
possible future liability." Minick & Parada, supra note 30, at  167. 
76. See Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 24-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (imposing a fiduciary 
duty on the broker to deal honestly and fairly with the buyer). 
11351 SELLING REAL ESTATE BROKl3R 1153 
on the broker for his professional expertise and for his ability 
to provide vital information concerning the property. The bro- 
ker should therefore recognize a duty to the purchaser to use 
reasonable care to make certain that this information is accu- 
rate. If the broker fails to use reasonable care in obtaining or 
communicating information, the purchaser should have a cause 
of action against the broker for negligent misrepresentation. 
To satisfy this duty of reasonable care, the broker should 
use his professional expertise to discover any material defects 
of the seller's property. The broker must not merely rely on the 
information provided by the seller concerning the property. The 
broker should be required to verify all information received 
from the seller by routinely conducting a n  independent inspec- 
tion of the property to discover any information which might 
materially affect the property's value or desirability. 
The imposition on the broker of a duty to diligently inspect 
the seller's property will benefit all parties to the transaction. 
Under the current market structure, many purchasers wrongly 
believe that the broker is acting in their best interest. Such a 
belief is evidenced by the rash of suits against brokers and 
sellers for fraud, negligent or innocent misrepresentation, and 
simple negligence.?? However, many of these suits could be 
avoided if the broker would (1) inform the purchaser, in writ- 
ing, a t  the beginning of their relationship that the broker is in 
a fiduciary relationship with the seller, and (2) conduct a dili- 
gent inspection of the property to discover and disclose to the 
potential purchaser any material defects affecting the 
property's value or desirability. 
Imposing a duty on the broker to diligently inspect the 
seller's property would alert the broker of his duty to the 
purchaser-to use reasonable care to avoid misleading the 
purchaser. This duty avoids both the dual agency and the sub- 
agency problems while still allowing for fair treatment of the 
purchaser. This high standard of conduct will not only create a 
more honest and ethical environment within the real estate 
industry, but will also clarify the duties and expectations of all 
the parties involved-the broker, the seller, and the purchaser. 
Brett L Hopper 
77. See cases cited supra note 3. 
